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This  paper  explores  a  process  which  I  denote  as  “young  workforce 
disposal” (YWD).  YWD reflects the fact that many young people enter the labor 
market  as  dependent  employees,  at  some  later  time  they  are  dismissed  and 
(presumably) move into never-ending unemployment.  Long term unemployment 
may  last  two,  three,  four  years,  but,  in  the  end,  it  should  lead  to  re-entry  in 
working activities.  If it does not, i.e. if we observe young men separating from 
their jobs for whatever reason, and, for as long as ten or more years, disappearing 
from the labor force altogether, then it becomes problematic to define such events 
simply  as  long  term  unemployment.  YWD  seems  to  be  an  appropriate 
denomination,  as  it  conveys  the  idea  that  young  workers  become  a  disposable 
commodity. 
Workforce disposal is evident and dramatic in Italy: out of 100 new young 
entries, about 70 are still in the labor market 10 years after entry if their first job 
spell was at least one year long. For those – three times as many -  who have 
started their career with a short employment spell (< 3 months),  10-year survival 
does not reach 50%.  A simple model of the short-medium run development of the 
YWD  process  is  estimated:  labor  cost  dynamics  explains  about  50%  of  the 
survival  process.  A  comprehensive,  structural,  exploration  of  its  long  run 
evolution is, instead,  problematic for lack of longitudinal data going back to the 
Seventies. 
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1  Introduction 
 
This  paper  explores  a  process  which  I  denote  as  “young  workforce 
disposal” (YWD).  YWD reflects the fact that many young people enter the labor 
market  as  dependent  employees,  their  services  are  “used”  for  few  years  as  a 
disposable  commodity,  after  which  they  disappear  from  the  labor  market,  no 
longer observable in a longitudinal dataset that covers  working careers from start 
to retirement. 
Long term unemployment of the young  may last two, three, four years, but, 
in the end, it should lead to re-entry in working activities.    If it does not – this is 
what I am concerned about -  i.e. if we observe young men separating from their  
jobs for whatever reason,  and, for as long as ten or more years, disappearing from 
the  labor  force  altogether,  it  becomes,    I  suspect,    problematic  to  define  such 
events simply as long term unemployment.     I  claim that young people, either 
“unemployed”  or  “out  of  the  labor  force”    without  interruption  for  many 
consecutive years, ought to be found back at work before reaching maturity, unless 
they are either seriously ill or too rich to need a job.  Neither of the two seems 
plausible, given the magnitude of observable events in Italy (and possibly in other 
countries of Southern Europe, for which no data are for the time being available).  
The third, more likely possibility, is that many of them may decide (or may be 
forced for lack of better alternatives) to join the irregular/black economy which 
goes  undetected  in  any  administrative  database,  and  often  also  in  labor  force 
surveys.
1 
These events should be viewed as premature and presumably involuntary 
exits from the labor force, and/or the consequence of outright processes of young 
workforce disposal after use.   YWD – pass me the term -  could  be economically 
“efficient”  if  the  productivity  of  the  disposed  workforce  is  low  and  training 
ineffective,  but it is dramatic from a social perspective, easily leading to social 
unrest. 
The term “long term unemployment” usually refers to unemployment spells 
that last 12 months or more (official statistics define long term unemployment as 
the spells exceeding 12 months). “Very long term” unemployment of the young  - 
lasting many years - has drawn less attention than it deserves, either for lack of 
long backward looking data, or because it is considered an unusual occurrence in 
contemporary economies.  In Italy it is not such an unusual occurrence.
2 
                                                 
1 As will be discussed in some detail in par. 5,  the order of magnitude of  YWD, alias very long 
term unemployment,  is consistent with the official youth unemployment rate in Italy, increased 
by a reasonable estimate of the number of young workers who end up in irregular, undetectable 
activities.    
2  Italy is, to my knowledge and for the time being, the only country for which the information is 
at hand.   But I would be surprised if similar developments were not in place also in other 
countries of Southern Europe.    4 
  Out of 100 new labor market entries in any given year between the mid 
Eighties and the late Nineties, less than 80 are still in the labor market 10 years 
after entry, provided that their first job spell was at least one year long. For those – 
three times as many -  whose first working experience is short (< 3 months),  10-
year survival does not reach 50%.
3  Economic conditions favoring the process of 
YWD  have been in place for over twenty years, and still are: several versions of 
temporary  contracts  were  introduced  in  order  to  enhance  youth  employability, 
which provided fiscal benefits to the employers and could be terminated at no cost 
after two years. In addition, aggregate demand never fully recovered after the deep 
recession of 1992-94.  As a consequence many young people – presumably those 
with  short  experience  and  modest  skills  -  were  laid  off  at  termination  of  the 
temporary contracts.  Seldom was there sufficient advantage for employers to hire 
individuals  laid  off  in  other  establishments:  experience  (usually  two  years  for 
temporary  contracts)  was    considered  of  small  value,  a  minimal  amount  of 
additional training necessary, and the benefits granted by the existing provisions to 
additional  temporary  hires  (of  different  individuals)  were  higher  than  other 
solutions. This may last as long as youth labor supply is sufficient. At some point 
in the not-too-distant future it may come to a halt.  
There are, of course, innumerable studies that touch upon issues closely 
related to “workforce disposal” as defined here: unemployment duration and state 
dependence,  labor  force  outflows  at  young  age,  low  partecipation,  permanent 
displacement  after  layoff,  labor  market  segmentation,  attrition  in  longitudinal 
datasets.
4  A survey of this literature would require a contribution of its own JEL-
style, and even the selection of the main contributions for each of the above items 
would be arbitrary. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: par. 2 provides the background picture 
with a short description of the Italian labor market.  Par. 3  describes the WHIP 
data and the measurement and estimation of  survival.  Par. 4  illustrates how new 
estimates of long term unemployment may be obtained from survival analysis. 
Par. 5 presents a quasi-Markov chain representation of the process of workforce 
disposal,  confirming  that  the  estimates  of  survival  are  consistent  with  the 
indications of the official LFS, and suggesting that, if Italian youth unemployment 
                                                 
3  The  likelihood  of  survival  is  significantly  higher  for  the  individuals  who  have  engaged  in 
successful search for new jobs after being dismissed, than for the stayers observed with the same 
employer since their initial career. 
4 Attrition is the term normally  used to define such occurrences in survey-based longitudinal 
databases. It reflects  problems of data collection and management. In our data, of administrative 
origin, observed attrition is the product of perfectly explainable  patterns of workforce utilization, 
which  have  nothing  to  do  with  data  collection.  I  am  not  claiming  that  some  genuine, 
undistinguishable, attrition could not be present in the data. Undoubtedly, however, the latter 
would have to be a minuscule share of the former. 
   5 
figures are to be compared with those of highly deregulated countries, an estimate 
of  13-14%  is  probably  more  reasonable  than  the  official  20%  rate  of  the  mid 
Nineties.    Descriptive  statistics  on  age  wage  and  labor  cost  differentials  are 
discussed in par. 6.   Par. 7  introduces a model of survival, wages and labor costs, 
aimed at explaining the short-medium run determinants of the process of young 
workforce  disposal:  the  model  structure  is  presented  in  7.1,  while  in    7.2 
estimation results are discussed.  Par. 8  takes up the problems of self-selection 





According to official statistics, Italy’s  unemployment rate of the 14-29  has 
hovered around 20% for many years, the second highest in the European Union.  
Long  term  unemployment  (defined  as  >  12  months)  touches  one  half  of  the 
unemployed.  Not until 2006  did youth unemployment take a downturn of 2-3 
p.p.,  matched, not surprisingly, by an increase in turnover rates.  
In Italy youth employment (20-29) steadily increased since the Sixties til 
1990  (from  4.0  million  in  1968  to  slightly  less  than  5.0  million  in  1990),  a 
consequence  of  the  baby  boom  and    of  the  increased  partecipation  of  young 
women.  The trend dramatically reversed in the early Nineties before the 1993 
recession: in 2002 dependent employment  of the young  was back to the level of 
the  mid  Seventies,  inspite  of:  (1)  several  programs  aimed  at  enhancing  labor 
market entry since the mid Eighties; (2)  the new cohorts shrank from 900,000 
during the baby boom to 500,000 nowadays.  
Labor market entry at the end of school is problematic too, compared to EU 
standards: the one-year transition probability for youth aged (15-19) is estimated 
at  0.54  from the Italian LFS, implying an average delay of 2 years after school 
termination.  The same probability at age (20-24) is 0.69, and at age (25-29) is 
0.70. 
5 
The labor market reforms of the last 25 years –  all leading to a variety of 
increasingly  flexible working arrangements - have changed the picture only to a 
limited extent.  Before the introduction of the CFL  (contratti di formazione e 
lavoro,  1984)  and  the  Pacchetto  Treu  (extending  the  utilization  of  temporary 
contracts, 1996),  it was common practice to terminate working contracts (not only 
of the young) circumventing a legislation which was very protective on paper, but 
easily bypassed in practice (as jurists put it, the “law in the books” is one thing, the 
                                                 
5 University graduates (first level degree) face a 8.5 months average waiting time before finding a 
job,  from a minimum of 5  months for engineering graduates and a maximum of 13 months for 
jurisprudence graduates.  The average unemployment rate for university graduates 3 years after 
the end of studies exceeds 8%   6 
”law in action” quite another matter).
6  The reforms have, as it were, legalized a 
good many of those terminations, at least as far as young people are concerned. 
Fig. 1 below shows the increasing trend of  separation rates from standard, 
open-end positions (with the exclusion of temporary contracts introduced by the 
Pacchetto Treu, 1996) in the 1986-2003  time window.  There is a sudden increase 
of young workers’ separations starting in 1993, three years before the reform.  The 




Fig.1-Separation rates from standard, open-end positions 1986-2003  
 
The next graph (fig. 2) shows the new entries in the labor market in the 
1986-2002 period: the dotted line displays the newly hired whose first initial spell 
lasted  at least 12 months, the thick one those whose initial spell lasts less than 3 
months.  The upper graph depicts the age-group 25-30; the lower one the group 
(19-22).  The number of “long” initial spells declines rapidly after peaking 2-3 
years  after  1986.    The  number  of   “very  short”  ones  increases  throughout  the 
whole period for the 25-30 group, and until 1994 for the younger age group, after 
                                                 
6  On  paper  the  Italian  labour  market  presents  a  high  degree  of  employment  protection.  
Protection,  however,  turns  out  to  be  mainly  “in  the  books”,  much  less  so  “in  action”.    An 
excellent analysis is provided in a recent book by F. Berton, M. Richiardi and S. Sacchi, Flex-
insecurity: perchè in Italia la flessibilità diventa precarietà, Il Mulino (2009).  See also: B. 
Contini and U. Trivellato (eds.), Eppur si muove:  mobilità e dinamiche del mercato del lavoro, Il 
Mulino (2005)   
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which it tapers off and then slightly declines.  Throughout the Eighties many of 
the newly hired were able to stay with their first employer at least one year before 
undertaking a pattern of mobility; and very short initial spells were relatively rare. 
We are therefore facing an additional, unambiguous signal of increased flexibility 
at the beginning of one’s career, which persists at all ages.   
 
 
Number of MALE workers by 
length of initial employment 
spell  between 1986 and 2003 
========================
age 25-30
---------- 12 months +
---------- <  3  months
age 19 – 22
---------- 12 months +
---------- <  3  months







Fig. 2 – No. workers by length of initial employment spell 1986-2003 
 
The key finding of this paper can be summarized as follows: out of 100 new 
young entries, between 45 and 85 % are still “at work”  (“survive”)  2  years after 
entry,  35 to 70% after 10 years, and only 25 to 40% after 17 years. Being “at 
work”  means  here  that  they  are  observed  in  any  one  of  the  Social  Security 
administrative  databases  (dependent  work,  self-employment,  project  work  and 
other atypical contracts included in the “gestione separata”).  A bad start makes a 
large difference in future outcomes.  For those who have had a continuous 12-
month employment spell at entry, survival at work  after 10 years is about  85%.  
For those – three times as many -  who have started their career with one or more 
short employment spells (< 3 months),  survival does not reach 50%.  Among the 
self-employed survival is higher 
7. 
 
These  numbers  raise  several  questions,  in  addition  to  the  obvious 
preoccupation for the magnitude of the “disposal” pattern as such, and the adverse 
effects that it will have on the labor market.   Where do all the “disposed” workers 
                                                 
7  The survival pattern  of the self-employed will be the object of a separate investigation.   8 
end up ?  Given the magnitude of “disposal”, voluntary exit from the labor force is 
out of the question.  Some youth may go back to school, but ought to reappear 
after few years (an observable, although not frequent event).  Few are hired each 
year in the public sectors excluded from the WHIP database (military or police 
service);  the  same  holds  for  the  university  graduates  who  move  directly  in 
professional independent activities. A number of young entrants move into the 
black economy (by definition, unobservable, the order of magnitude estimated by 
ISTAT at 15-20% of the labor force).
8  On this hypothesis we have an important 
confirmation  in  par.  6  where  we  present  estimates  that  are  consistent  with  an 
“extended” definition of unemployment inclusive of the individuals who belong to 
the irregular (undetectable) sectors of the economy.
9    Which does not reduce the 





3  The WHIP data and the measurement of survival 
 
The WHIP longitudinal data are a representative sample of the population 
of employees of the private sector, of the public, non-tenured employees, the self-
employed, as well as all those covered by atypical (non-standard) contracts. The 
sample -  population ratio is 1:90.  WHIP observations start in 1986 and, as of 
today, end in 2004.   WHIP does not cover tenured employees of the public sector 
(including the military service and the police), nor the professionals working on 
their own.  Since the late Eighties, however, almost all hires of young people in 
the  public  sector  have  taken  place  via  atypical  contracts.
11  Likewise,  young 
professionals usually begin their career in professional studies, hired with non-
standard contracts. All these categories are observed in WHIP.  
 
                                                 
8  Foreign  workers  who  return  to  their  home  country  after  leaving  a  job  in  Italy  would  be 
erroneously counted as “disposed”.  For this reason, as explained shortly, they have been deleted 
form our database.   
9 It is at times advocated that all irregular workers ought to be counted in the employment figures.  
This is an open and unresolved question which goes  beyond the scope of this paper.  The main 
problem being one of classification of what is being self reported in the LFS interviews, which, in 
turn, depends on the institutional setting and on the rulings of each national labor market.    
10 A similar, preliminary, exploration in Norway and Denmark indicates that the pseudo-survival 
rate 10 years after entry is between 90 and 95% of the initial lot.   Suggesting that the institutional 
setting explains such a huge difference may be true, but won’t tell what is behind the story.  Some 
comparative LFS statistics on long term unemployment in the European Union are provided in 
the  Appendix:  Italy  lags  behind  other  countries  on  all  counts,  but,  as  suggested  before,  the  
standard measurement of long term unemployment may fail to catch some of the most dramatic 
features of the problem. 
11 Very few, very lucky ones will be  granted tenure after 2-3 years.  The vast majority will have 
to wait  8/10 years, and until then they will be observed in WHIP.  Once they move into tenured 
positions  they will be well in their thirties, no longer relevant for this exploration.   9 
The basic statistic used in this exploration is survival in the labor market. 
Survival is estimated counting the number of individuals who have been employed 
since a given starting year and have not dropped out of the database at the end of 
the observation period, whether or not they have had intervening unemployment 
spells in between. Our database provides  information on unemployment spells 
only if  the workers  receive official unemployment compensation.  This is not a 
frequent  occurrence  in  Italy,  where  unemployment  benefits  are  available  for 
limited categories of workers.
12  If we observe missing observations of the same 
individual  for  some  time  (months  /years),  after  which  he/she  re-appears  as 
employed, we attribute the missing period to an unemployment spell, applying the 
extended definition of unemployment discussed at the end of par. 2.  Those who 
have  left  their  job  and,  at  some  date,  disappear  altogether  from  a  database 
supposed to cover the entire careers of “regular” workers, are the “non-survivors” 
at that date.
13 
We perform the analysis of survival on cells defined by annual cohorts of 
young employees, gender, year of labor market entry, length of the initial job spell 
(<  3  months,    3-12  months,  >  12    months),  geographical  area  (North,  Centre, 
South), industry (manufacturing and services)  and firm size of initial position.   
Foreign workers have been deleted from the database: those who return to their 
home-country after leaving a position in Italy would be counted as non-survivors, 
which would obviously be a mistaken inference. 
Cells are observed at one-year intervals from 1986  through 2002.  In some 
cases  we  also  disaggregate  cells  by  size  of  the  first  employer  (small=  <20 
employees; medium= 20-200;  large = 200+).  Each cell includes from a minimum 
of 4 to a maximum of 1089 individuals (median cell size  26, mean  59). 
Survival at year (t) is estimated counting the number of individuals who 
have not disappeared from the database at the end of t-th observation period.    Fig.  
3 exemplifies the counting methodology: it shows one cell containing the work 
histories of  8 individuals, A through H, observed between 1986 (year of entry for 
all)  and 2008:  
 
  
                                                 
12 A different form of compensation is instead available for temporary layoffs (Cassa Integrazione 
Guadagni), in which case workers are kept on the employer’s payroll and will be observed in the 
database as if they were still attached to their post. 
13 They may, nonetheless, reappear at some later date. Thus survival observed in, say,  2005 
could, in principle, be higher than survival observed in 1998.  But if survival is measured from a 
given initial date to a given final observation point, it will always appear as a non increasing 
function of time elapsed since the initial date of one’s first job.   10 
 
Fig. 3 -  Counting survival  
 
Let  the  survival  count  take  place  in  2008.    In  year  1993  we  count  the 
following survivors:  A, B, C, D, F, G and H  (yielding a survival rate = 7/8 = 
0.875), as E has exited two years after entry and no longer reappears. In year 2000  
the following have survived:  A, B, C, D, G and H,  yielding a survival equal to  
6/8 = 0.75.  Notice that, as the count is done in 2008,  individual B is counted as 
survivor  through  2003,  as  he  did  move  into  unemployment  (extended  version) 
between  1991  and  1993,  and  between  1997  and  1999,  but  his  working  career 
continues at least until 2003.   Obviously, in 2008 he could find himself in a long 
spell of unemployment whose ending will occur years later. If that were the case,  
our survival count in 2003 would be downward biased.  This is the truncation 
problem that we (partially) avoid by narrowing  the observation window toward 
the  end  (in  the  example  below  we  end  in  1998,  leaving  6  extra  years  before 
truncation).    The  complete  count  through  1998  would  lead  to  the  following 
survival schedule:  
 
1986  87  88  89  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98 
1  1  7/8  7/8  7/8  7/8  7/8  7/8   6/8  6/8  6/8  6/8  6/8 
















Fig. 4 – 6 - Survival curves: selected cohorts by industry, geography, year-of-
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Fig. 7 - 9 - Survival curves: selected cohorts by industry, geography, year-of-
entry,  mobility  
 
A few selected  survival curves are displayed above. Fig. 4 -6  display the 
survival of cohorts who experienced a very short initial employment spell  (< 3 
months) vs.  the same cohorts with a long spell (> 12 months). The impact of the 
first spell duration is very clear: an immediate drop of survival in (t+1) and (t+2) 
for entrants whose initial job spell is less than 3 months, followed by a continuing 
relatively steep fall. Entrants with a longer initial employment spell (12+  months) 
do much better on all counts.   
The timing of labor market entry is also relevant: if the initial job starts in 
expansionary  years,  survival  is  likely  to  be  higher  than  if  the  working  career 
begins during recession times. In  fig. 4-6  two cohorts are compared:  the  dotted 
line refers to cohorts who  first entered in the expansionary 1988, and are followed 
til  (t+  14  =  2002),    the  thick  one  refers  to  entries  of  the  recessionary  1993, 
followed til  (t+9 = 2002):  the fall of survival is steeper for the cohorts entering in 
1993.  Less clear, at first sight, is the impact of the age group and that of the sector 
of economic activity.  
The next and foremost additional  factor is mobility following the initial 
job: the likelihood of survival of the movers is much higher than the stayers’ (who, 
as will be seen, retain a slight wage advantage). The second set of fig. 7-9  display  
the impact of mobility. 
Initial  wages  are  also  good  predictors  of  survival:  the  probability  of 
surviving after a bad start (first job spell < 3 months cum wage in first quartile of 
the distribution) is about four times as low as that following a good start.
14  
                                                 
14 A similar finding on UK data is reported in Stewart, Mark B & Swaffield, Joanna K, 1999. 
"Low  Pay  Dynamics  and  Transition  Probabilities,"  Economica,  vol.  66(261),  pages  23-42, 
February.  
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Let  it  be  clear  what  the  survival  rates  imply.  Suppose  we  observe  60 
survivors 10 years after the initial job:  these are not people necessarily at work for 
10  consecutive  years:    in  addition  to  having  had  different  employment  spells 
(possibly in different firms), they may have had unemployment spells in the 10-
year  period,  but  have  re-entered  employment  at  the  end  of  the  10-th  year  of 
observation, after which they are no longer present in the data.    
 
 
4  Estimating unemployment duration from survival functions 
 
Survival  schedules  allow  to  compute  long  term  unemployment  duration, 
strictu sensu, i.e. of given cohorts currently unemployed (extended definition as 
discussed in par. 2 and 3). This is the concept referred to by official statistics 
under the heading “share of unemployment exceeding 12 months” (i.e. among the 
unemployed).
15 
Consider  the  following  example,  relative  to  male  workers  in  the 
manufacturing industry of Northern Italy, aged 22.25: 
  
Year of entry   
 Initial spell  
 12 months + 
1987-2002 
15 yrs. Span 
1987-1997 
10 yrs. Span 
1992-2002 
10 yrs. Span 
1987  -  all    9.49  7.86   \    --------- 
1992  -  all  -----       ---------  5.47 
1987- stayers  11.51  8.97        -------- 
1987- movers   5.15  3.44        -------- 
1992- stayers      6.15 
1992- movers      3.60 
 
                                                 
15 A different concept is “overall unemployment duration”  (OUD) referred to the whole labor 
force. The “overall” concept  estimates the total amount of time spent in unemployment within a 
given subset of the labor force.  The survival functions allow a simple calculation of “overall 
unemployment  duration”,  as  depicted  in  the  following  graph:  
.   15 
The 2002-unemployment rate of the above cohort is 21%; the share of long 
term unemployed (12 months+) of the group 15-24 in 2000, according to OECD is 
46%  Average unemployment length  – as estimated here -  is dramatic, longer for 
those entered in 1987, observed throughout the 15-year window 1987-2002, than 
for those entered 5 years later. The order of magnitude of these estimates suggests 
that the share of long term unemployment provided by official sources may be 
very misleading. The differences between movers and stayers are big and reflect 
those depicted in fig.7-9.    
  
 
5  A quasi-Markov chain representation of the youth labor market 
 
The youth labor market lends itself to a representation in terms of a quasi-
Markov chain
16.  The chain is defined by states that correspond to employment 
and  “extended  unemployment  of  different  durations:    one-year  employment,  
more-than-one-year  employment,  one-year  unemployment,  two-year 
unemployment, more-then two-years unemployment.  Transition probabilities are 
estimated  on  the  basis  of  a  standard  logit  model  à  la  Heckman  on  individual 
careers of male workers aged 16-29 
17.  Transitions are allowed only between 
time-contiguous states: 
 
from / to       U1         U2                   U3+       E1         E2+ 
U1  0  0.60  0  0.4  0 
U2  0  0  0.85  0.15  0 
U3+  0  0  0.93  0.07  0 
E1  0.05  0  0  0  0.96 
E2+  0.04  0  0  0  0.96 
Steady-state 
  U   = 27% 
0.03  0.02  0.22  0.03  0.70 
 
The steady state distribution of the above matrix (reached in 6-7 iterations 
from a starting position close to the one observed  in the late Nineties)  yields the 
following result: 73% of the workforce in employment (70% in more-than-one-
year positions  E2+); 27% unemployed, extended definition (of which 22%  in 
long term unemployment U3++).     The steady state unemployment figure is 6-8 
p.p.  higher  than  the  official  youth  unemployment  rate  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Millennium: this difference is coherent with the hypothesis that over 200 thousand 
young men may be hidden in the irregular sectors, without any presence in the 
                                                 
16 A quasi-Markov chain is defined as a process in which states may not be of equal length.  
Transitions are estimated as usually, and the steady state is calculated and interpreted as in any  
Markov chain,  but a concept like the mean recurrence time is no longer applicable.  
17 See B. Contini and A. Poggi (2008).   16 
official economy
18, and therefore undetected in the Labor Force Survey.
19  The 
figure of 200 thousand male individuals (16-29) is a conservative estimate of the 
presence of young men in the black economy, estimated at least 15% of total labor 
force according to official statistics.
20  This exercise suggests that comparative 
analyses of youth unemployment between Italy and highly deregulated countries 
ought to be done with utmost care: in the US, UK, Ireland, Denmark (and others 
too) the vast majority of jobs that would be considered irregular in Italy - the main 
reason  being  tax  evasion  (in  particular,  social  security  contributions)  -  are 
perfectly regular as they are usually exempted from s.s.c.  Thus, an estimate of 13-
14%, which accounts for the extra 6-8 p.p. attributable to irregular activities, is 
probably more reasonable than the official 20% rate of the mid Nineties.   
 
6  In search of explanations: wages and labor cost 
 
Do wages and labor costs explain the dynamics of workforce disposal ? We 
start  by  showing  a  few  descriptive  indicators,  and  in  the  par.  7  we  turn  to 
econometric estimation.   
Italy  is  following  the  world-wide  trend  of  increasing  wage  differentials, 
attributable to the demand for high skills.  Wage differentials between young and 
adult-older  individuals  have  increased  also  independently  from  the  skill 
component; and the reforms aimed at enhancing the job opportunities of young 
people – by granting wage subsidies to employers - have had an additional effect 
of  widening  them.    Tab.  A  displays  mean  and  percentiles  of  the  earnings 
differential ratios between blue-collars, aged  <25 and  >45, regularly employed as 
                                                 
18 Excluding, therefore, people who work for black money, in addition to holding a regular job 
(for instance a blue-collar at Fiat who rounds the budget doing plumbing maintenance during the 
week-ends).      Furthermore,  the  earnings  of  criminal  and/or  mafia-type  activities  are  often 
laundered / invested in “regular” covering businesses; thus, also outright criminals may appear as 
“regular” workers.    
19  The 200 thousand - figure is reached as follows: 6-8 p.p. of the male workforce aged 16-24  
(population  4.2 million, participation rate 30% =  1.2 million workforce)  yields 100 thousand 
individuals.  6-8% of the male workforce 25-29 (population 2 million; participation 60% = 1.2 
million workforce), yields the remaining  100 thousand. 
20 The borderline  between  inactivity,  unemployment without subsidies and irregular activities 
defies detection in the WHIP data, but similar problems arise also in LFS-type surveys, all the 
more so in  areas  where there is a considerable amount of black-grey  (or next-to-criminal) 
activities.  Here, a  young male who reports to be working,  may be a “regular“ or an “irregular” 
worker. He may report to be unemployed even if he works full time in the black.  Being classified 
as  “inactive” or “unemployed” depends on the classification rules and the interpretation given to  
one’s “recent” job search activity  (see E. Battistin and E. Rettore, 2008).    There is plenty of 
anecdotal evidence (to be taken very seriously)  that many youth who work in the black economy 
will report themselves as unemployed or inactive.  In the poorest neighbourhoods of Naples 
estimated youth unemployment is close to 40%,  with  the extent of  the black economy also 
known to be at its highest. The  situation in the banlieus of Paris may not be too different.     17 
dependent workers.  In 1985 the mean ratio was 0.71; it steadily declined through 
2003.  In principle, this trend ought to favor the utilization of young workforce. 
 
Tab. A.1 -  Gross earnings  differentials young/adult workers  
 
       
 
Labor  cost/wage  ratios  have  followed  a  different  pattern  (tab.  A.2):  the  North-South 
differential was very sizeable for all the young age groups til the mid Nineties in the 
manufacturing sectors, and declined thereafter when some of the provisions in favor of 
the industrialization of the  South were phased out.  Differentials were, instead,  smaller 
in the service sectors through the whole observation period.    
         
Tab.A.2 -  Labor costs 
  
    labor cost / wage ratio  
age 1987 1993 1998 2002
mfg north 19-22 1.27 1.32 1.30 1.28
mfg south 19-22 1.13 1.15 1.22 1.22
mfg north 22-25 1.35 1.40 1.39 1.36
mfg south 22-25 1.13 1.15 1.28 1.23
mfg north 25-30 1.38 1.42 1.41 1.41
mfg south 25-30 1.12 1.14 1.30 1.29
serv north 19-22 1.33 1.38 1.34 1.34
serv south 19-22 1.26 1.28 1.27 1.29
serv north 22-25 1.37 1.43 1.37 1.35
serv south 22-25 1.28 1.31 1.26 1.23
serv north 25-30 1.41 1.44 1.39 1.38
serv south 25-30 1.29 1.32 1.30 1.26  
 
Since the Eighties various pieces of legislation were introduced to enhance 
youth  employment:  one  the  one  hand  they  have  made  young  workers  less 
expensive than adults; on the other hand they have guaranteed a high degree of 
flexibility as long as the young hires are  retained under the contracts that granted 
such benefits.  These provisions, however, have often made it profitable to hire   18 
young  people,  keep  them  on  the  job  as  long  as  the  benefits  accrue  to  the 
employers, and then fire and replace them with new entrants hired with the same 
contracts as  the ones terminated. Apparently, provisions aimed at preventing such 
practices have not been very effective.  For the time being labor supply allows 
such practices, but it may no longer do so in the next future.  
The main instrument of those years, the training-at-work contract (Contratto 
di  Formazione  Lavoro,  CFL),  started  operating  in  1985.  The  program  granted 
employers willing to hire eligible workers a substantial labor cost rebate consisting 
in  a  50%  reduction  of  social  security  contributions  (s.s.c.)  and  automatic 
termination at the end of two years.  The program featured also an on-the job 
training component. At the beginning, eligible people were workers aged 16-29. 
Several reforms of the program took place over the years. The main one, for our 
purpose, took place in 1991, when s.s.c. rebates were reduced to 25%, and age 
eligibility was extended to 32. As a result labor costs increased from 1991 onward, 
more  in the North than in the South, where they were complemented by additional 
measures.  The  main  one  being  a  generalized  tax  rebate  to  all  employers  of 
Southern  Italy,  that had been in place for many  years, and was  phased out in 
1994.
21  As we shall see in par.7.2 changes in labor costs  explain about 50%  of 
the process of workforce disposal. 
 
 






                                                 
21  Moreover, in 1994 employers were allowed to hire new training-at-work workers during year t, 
only if at least 60% of the CFL workers whose contract terminated in t-1 and t-2 were retained on 
a permanent basis. Thus, this new reform change affected the duration of youth unemployment 
with minor  impact on labor costs.    19 
7.  A  model of survival, labor cost and wages 
 
7.1 -  Structure 
 
While  the  process  of  “disposal”  is  essentially  demand  driven,  supply 
characteristics  emerge  as  we  observe  the  different  survival  and  unemployment  
performance  of the movers compared to the stayers.   In this paper, however, 
supply factors are left aside as second-order determinants.
22  Our focus will be on 
the  demand  side:  the  available  data  can  be  used  to  estimate  reasonable 
specifications derived from demand considerations, while few would be available 
in order to unveil the supply side of the story.
23    
The  structural  determinants  of  survival  are  estimated  on  cells  of  young 
homogeneous individuals defined by the following items: 
-  age group of the relevant cohort  (3 groups) 
-  year of first entry in the labor market  (15 years, from 1988 to2001) 
-  duration of first employment spell (3 groups) 
-  economic branch of activity (2 industries)  
-  geographical area (3 areas) 
-  size of first employer  (3 size groups) 
-  mobility (2 types: movers and stayers) 
In principle we have 4860 cells  (the product of all the above attributes):  
many are empty, and some include only one individual.  We retain only those with 
at least 4 individuals, which leaves over 2500 cells in Northern Italy and over 
1800 in Southern Italy of male workers (and about 2/3 as many of women, which 
we are not using for the time being). 
   
Cell (grouped) estimation is advisable when long term interpretations are 
sought: between estimators (estimation on cell data are indeed between estimators) 
are  more  appropriate  than  within  estimators,  intended  to  follow  short  run 
individual behavior as it evolves over time.  In addition, cell estimation helps to 
bypass  the  problem  of  unobserved  heterogeneity:  to  the  extent  that  each  cell 
includes  a  sufficient  number  of  individuals  with  similar  characteristics, 
unobserved  heterogeneity  gets  averaged  out  leaving  the  estimators  unbiased, 
                                                 
 
22 The supply side becomes first-order relevant for the explanation of youth participation to the 
irregular economy, as will be discussed in  Appendix 3. 
23  Standard  theory  of  labor  demand  is  not  sufficient,  however,    to  explain  the  process  of 
workforce disposal. An additional ingredient is necessary, namely the dualistic structure of the 
labor  market,  where  permanent  and  temporary  contracts  (often  subsidized  and  with  minimal 
firing costs) have been made freely available to employers who hire according to comparative 
profitability.  A simple two-period model of firm choice of hiring  by means of  permanent vs. 
temporary contracts is presented in Appendix 2.   20 
provided    that  heterogeneity  is  uncorrelated  with  factors  that  impact  on  the 
dependent variable (i.e. regressors and  defining dimensions of each cell).    
   
Regression analysis on survival ought to be done with care: all survival 
schedules  are  monotonically  decreasing  in  time,  each  having  at  most  17  time 
observations for the first observable labor market entries (from 1986 to 2003), and 
only 7 for the most recent ones (1996-2003). Therefore the introduction of many 
dummies will yield high R2,  leaving little of substance to be explained.     
It  is,  therefore,  prudent  to  perform  estimation  on  first  differences  of  
survival,  rather than levels.  
Graphical  exploration  has  already  helped  to  single  out  three  important 
factors: the duration of the first employment spell as a proxy of initial conditions, 
the timing of labor market entry that catches the impact of the business cycle, and 
mobility. All three have been used to define the cells.   The defining attributes 
enter as control regressors,  altogether 20 dummy variables. 
 
A number of additional factors may “co-explain” survival: 
-  the annual rate of change of labor cost, specific to each age group 
24 
-  the inflows of potential female competitors  
-  youth labor supply (proxied by the youth participation rate) 
In addition we shall introduce a number of instrumental variables, corresponding 
to  the    timing  of  legislative  reforms  intended  to  enhance  the  employment 
opportunities of young people. Such programs ought to have an important impact 
on the dynamics of workforce disposal, and – as will be explained – are crucial for 
identification.  
 
The  model  includes  three  endogenous  variables,  SURV,  LCOST,  WAGE,  and  
two weakly endogenous variables: DUR and MOB.  The latter receive a different 
treatment for reasons that need explanations: 
 
(i)   DUR.  While it may reflect individual characteristics at the beginning of one’s 
career  (people who have been able to secure a “long”  first job duration may be 
sorted according to their ability), it should  be treated as exogenous.   As fig. 1-2     
indicate,  the duration of one’s first job spell has a  clear historical trend, with 
the  steady growth of short initial employment spells (< 3 months) vs.  longer ones 
(12+)  throughout  the Nineties, a  consequence of several pieces of legislation that 
increased flexibility at entry. 
 
                                                 
24 Total labor cost includes social security contributions and other indirect elements, and is net of 
employer subsidies. Individual labor costs are difficult to estimate because monetary benefits 
accrue  to  employers  –in  the  form  of  tax  and/or  social  security  contribution  subsidies  and/or 
rebates -  in different years, as a function of workers’ age, industry and geographical location of 
the workplace, and following  rules that get often changed as politics suggests.   21 
 
BOX:   variables denomination 
SURV(i,t)   = survival 
LCOST(i,t) = labor cost 
WAGE(i,t) =  wages 
DUR(i) =  duration of first job spell  (one dummy for each of three spell length) 
MOB(i) =  mobility  (dummy) 
MFG(i) = manufacturing (dummy) 
AGE(i) =  age at entry (one dummy for each of three age groups) 
GEO(i) = geography  (one dummy for each of three regional groups)  
SIZE(i) = firm size (one dummy for each of three size groups) 
CPI(t) = consumer price index 
UNEMPL(i,t) = unemployment rate (regional) 
CFL-NORTH(i,t) = dummy (for CFL-contract in the North, activated until 1990)  
CFL-SOUTH(i,t) = dummy (for CFL- contract in the South, activated until 1990) 
TAXRED(i,t) = generalized tax reduction in the South (dummy = 1, through 1994)  
W_DEVST(i) = standard deviation of initial wages = IV 
WAGE-0 (i) = average initial wages = IV 
ENT-YR(i) = year of labor market first entry (dummy) 
W-PART(i,t) = inflows of potential female competitors 
Y-PART(t) = youth partecipation rate (proxy of labor supply) 
IV =  instrumental variables;  i = cohort;  t = observation year  
FLEX(t) = contract flexibility  (unobservable)  
     (ii)  MOB.  In principle, the two-way causal relation between mobility and 
survival is beyond doubt:  movers may (and will) survive longer than stayers, but, 
at the same time, low survival may  provide the incentive to move  to the best, 
more endowed,  individuals.   Our problem is one of measurement: as previously 
explained, at the end of the observation period we sort individuals who have been 
employed all the time with the same firm vs. those who have moved at least once, 
and use mobility defined thereof as one defining dimension of our cells.  Therefore 
it cannot be treated as endogenous, as it would imply  that a job change occurred 
at year (t=1)  can be explained by survival many years later (say, at  t=16).  While, 
it  goes  without  saying,  survival  could  (and  is)  explained  by  the  individuals’ 
previous history, mobility being one of its attributes.    
It is, nonetheless, instructive  to run a  descriptive probit regression, aimed at 
showing    the  extent  to  which  initial  conditions  (age  at  entry,  year  of  entry, 
geography, industry,   initial wage)  explain the different status of movers and 
stayers. 
 
The  structure  of  the  model  is  as  follows    (<lin>    stands  for  linear  function; 
endogenous variables are underlined): 
   22 
(1) ∆ SURV = lin1 (LCOST, FLEX, MFG, GEO, SIZE, AGE, DUR,  
ENT-YR, MOB, W-PART, Y-PART) 
(2)  WAGE = lin2 (MFG, GEO, SIZE, AGE, MOB, CPI, UNEMPL) 
(3)  LCOST = lin3 (WAGE, MFG, GEO, AGE,  TAXRED, CFL- 
  GEO1,  CFL-GEO2) 
 
The probit specification for MOB is  
 
(4)  MOB = probit (AGE, MFG, GEO,ENT-YR, WAGE-0 ) 
    
Identification  of  the  model  rests  on  the  introduction  of  various  instrumental 
variables:  
 
Eq.1= <∆ SURV >  includes two endogenous variables in the  r.h.s.:  the main one,  
labor  cost  LCOST,  is  strictly  endogenous,  while  MOB  is    only  weakly 
endogenous.  LCOST is the driving factor from the demand side and is likely to  
embody the influence of contract flexibility (FLEX), a multidimensional concept 
that  often  defies  observation.    FLEX  is  a  very  attractive  feature  from  the 
employers’ perspective, and, sometimes, also from the employees’: it may impact 
on survival in both directions, by increasing it if the employers value workers’ 
experience  and  extend  the  contract  duration  beyond  legal  termination;  or  by 
reducing  it  if  the  employers  decide  instead  to  hire  a  new  individual,  taking 
advantage of the almost zero firing costs, of the renewable fiscal benefits and of 
the availability of a prompt replacement.  From the estimation perspective, the 
potential two-way impact of FLEX reduces the omission bias: if its regression 
coefficient is pulled in both directions, it could be close to zero.  Otherwise the 
coefficient of LCOST is the most likely target of omission bias.         
At least three restrictions are necessary for identification, but more than three are 
available.  They  are  provided  by  three    regressors    reflecting    policy  changes  
appearing  in  eq.  (3)  –  to  be  described  below  -  ,  as  well  as  by  the  additional 
exogenous  <CPI>  and  <UNEMPL>  included  in  any  specification  of  wage 
equations.  The influence of the business cycle is caught by  the  <ENTR-YR>  
dummies.  Not unexpectedly, MOB is correlated with the  residuals, and will have 
to be  instrumented  (the appropriate IV being W_DEVST).    
 
Eq.  2  =  <WAGE>    is  in  reduced  form  as  it  includes  no  strictly  endogenous 
regressors in the r.h.s.,  MOB being only weakly endogenous. We shall  test for 
potential correlation of residuals and MOB,  and proceed accordingly if necessary.  
In order to test the validity of instruments  that will be necessary in the labor cost 
eq. (3) -  where <WAGE>  appears as the main regressor   -  we shall fictitiously  
introduce  them in the  r.h.s.  of  eq. (2):  if they turn out to have no significant 
impact on <WAGE> -  as they do -,  they may be safely used as instruments in eq.   23 
(3). In equation (2) we may count also on the additional zero restrictions on  DUR,  
ENT-YR,  W-PART;      
 
Eq. 3 = <LCOST> includes one endogenous  variable – WAGE - in the  r.h.s.  The 
additional  explanatory  power  is  provided  by      three    exogenous    variables  
corresponding to the  timing of  reform changes aimed at reducing  young people’s  
labor costs (TAXRED, CFL-NORTH  and CFL-SOUTH).  In addition, the same 
restrictions  as in eq. 2  apply here. 
 
 
7.2  Estimation 
 
All regressions are weighted by the cell size. 
 
It is convenient to discuss first the <WAGE> equation (2):  it is as a linear 
function of  exogenous regressors,  and of  the weakly endogenous MOB. All 
results are in line with standard priors.  Firm size and age confirm well known 
patterns  of  wages,  increasing  with  respect  to  both.  The  CPI  price  index    and 
UNEMPL  are respectively positive and negative, and highly significant.   Inspite 
of its weak endogeneity,  MOB  turns out to be correlated with the residuals and is 
instrumented   (via the standard deviation of the cell initial wages    <W-DEVST>    
yielding a positive coefficient, in line with our prior, but  below significance.   In 
addition  and  more importantly,  the three dummies reflecting policy changes in 
the hiring rules of young workers (CFL-NORTH,  CFL-SOUTH,  TAXRED)  are 
non-significant,    enabling    their  use  as  instrumental  variables  in  equation  (3), 
where <WAGE> enters as the main explanatory variable.  
     
    LCOST = equation (3) explains labor cost.  The driving explanation is in 
<WAGE>, with a regression coefficient equal to 1.35:  0.35  is  the average rate of 
social security contributions on gross wages.  While <WAGE> is endogenous,  it 
is  specified  in    semi-reduced  form:    OLS  estimates  are  therefore  unbiased    if 
<WAGE> is directly used as regressor,  instead of its predictor.   Age, industry 
and geography display their well known impact.   More importantly, two policy 
change  dummies  –  the    CFL  contract  in  the  North  (<CFL-NORTH>)  and  the 
generalized tax reduction in favor of employers located in the South (TAXRED) -  
are highly significant  with the expected negative sign,  reflecting the fact that both 
exerted  a beneficial (reducing) effect on labor costs before the implementation of 
more stringent rules during the mid Nineties. Not surprisingly,  the CFL contract 
adopted in the South (CFL_SOUTH) had almost no impact  until the generalized 
tax rebate was available.  By the early Nineties policy change was responsible for 
a 17-20 eu  monthly labor cost increase  (about 1.5% each month).   24 
Eq. (1):  <∆ SURV >  is the change in each cell’s survival in year (t).  Eq. 
(1)  is estimated by  2SLS, using the predicted values of <LCOST>   obtained 
from    (3).    As  expected,  labor  cost  (<LCOST_hat>  is  negative  and  highly 
significant.  Between 1986 and  2002  the yearly growth rate of real labor cost was  
about  2 p.p.  corresponding to somewhat less than  25 eu / year 
25.   This translates 
into a change in survival of  - 0.75 p.p.  each year  vis-à-vis a change equal to the 
average yearly growth of labor cost of  25  eu  (the estimated coefficient delivers   
- 0.0003 * 25 = - 0.0075).   Holding everything else constant at the benchmark 
cell,  the  labor  cost  dynamics  explains  almost  half  of  average  survival  in  the 
observation  period:    -  0.75    p.p.    for    16  consecutive  years  yields  -  12  p.p.  
implying that,  initial survival being 100%,  16 years later it  is down to 88 %, 
against an observed overall survival  of about 75%.  This result may, however, be 
affected by the forced omission of FLEX.  As explained above, contract flexibility 
may exert both positive and negative influence on survival.  Its negative impact is 
proxied,  to some extent, by the length of the initial employment spells <DUR>.  
As depicted in fig. 2, since the early Nineties, hires of new entering individuals 
have been more and more frequently characterized by short initial employment 
spells, a consequence of increased contract flexibility. <DUR> displays positive 
and significant coefficients in the equation of  <∆ SURV >: the reduced frequency 
of initial employment spells 12+  months long  (against the growth of less-than-3-
month- initial spells) reduces survival by 1.2 p.p.   The positive impact of FLEX – 
if any – is instead embodied in the regression coefficient of <LCOST_hat>:  
it may lead  to a downward  biased estimate of the impact of  LCOST on survival, 
the magnitude of which is difficult to assess from the available data
26.     
Age, industry and geography are all influential as expected, while firm size 
is not.  Interaction variables between AGE and DUR are not significant.  The years 
of  labor  market  entry  <ENTR-YR>  catch  the  impact  of  the  business  cycle.  
Finally,  the  change  of  women’s  entries  in  the  labor  market  (<W-PART>)  
positively  affect  young  men’s  survival  in  the  South  –  a  remarkable,  although 
slight, signal of complementariety – but not in the North.   Last but not least, as in 
eq. (2) and  inspite of its weak endogeneity,  MOB is correlated with the residuals 
and instrumented via  <W_DEVST>:  it has the expected positive sign – movers 
survive longer than stayers -  but, here too,  it is below significance.  The striking 
                                                 
25  The overall average labor cost  in 1986  was about 1500  eu/month, and 1800 eu/month  by 
2002 (expressed in real  2000-prices).  
26 Suppose, for simplicity, that   ∆ SURV = b LCOST + c FLEX + res,  with  b<0  and  c>0.  The 
omission bias leads to underestimate b.  In fact   plim b^  =  b + c [cov(LCOST. FLEX) / var 
(FLEX) ].  It is reasonable to assume that  cov (LCOST. FLEX) < 0,  i.e. that reforms aimed at 
enhancing employability will reduce labor cost and increase contract flexibility.   Hence it will 
then  hold that  plim b^ < b. 
   25 
impact  of mobility on survival –  displayed in  fig. 7-9 – is evidently caught by 
the rest of the specification.  
 
A linear probit regression  – a useful appendix to the model - explains the 
mobility dichotomous variable  <MOB> :  AGE, GEO, MFG  at the start of each 
worker’s career,  the year of labor market entry <YR-ENT>  appear as highly 
significant in determining whether the cell components will choose to be movers 
or  stayers.    In  addition,  and  very  interestingly,  average  initial  cell  wage    (W-
INITIAL)  appears as an important determinant of future mobility – the higher the 
wage, the lower the probability of mobility – while the first employment spell 





B.1   <WAGE>     IV  estimation     
  Coefficient  | t-statistic |  1150  cells 
MOB  65.63  1.07  instrumented    by 
<W_DEVST> 
non-significant 
MFG  -  9.68  2.65   
GEO   -  21.76  1.17  non-significant 
SIZE –MEDIUM  31.60  7.39   
SIZE-BIG  106.98  9.05   
AGE 22-25  39.86  8.14   
AGE 25-30  102.32  18.56   
CPI  -  3.12  38.42   
UNEMPL  -  4.17  5.06   
CFL-NORTH  -  5.64  0.57  non significant 
CFL-SOUTH  -  1.71  0.12         “ 
TAX-RED  -  5.30  0.43         “ 
 
                                                 
27  Cell  numerosity  is  different  in  each  equation,  depending  on  the  degree  of  disaggregation 
allowed by the data.  Estimation on  ∆ -SURV  is performed on 8842 cells, as several interactions 
have been introduced in the equation,  yielding more disaggregated cells that  are not necessary in 
the WAGE equation (1150 cells). The  LCOST equation instead  is estimated on 192 cells only, 
which is the maximum allowed by the measurement of  labor costs.   26 
 
B.2  <∆ -SURV>               |        2 SLS              
    Coefficient  | t-statistic |  8842 cells 
LCOST- hat  -  0.000033  6.79     
MOB  0.0197  0.99  n.s. 
AGE 22-25  0.0007  0.30  n.s. 
AGE 25-30  0.0059  1.89   
MFG  -  0.0015  1.32  n.s. 
GEO(North)  0.0078  6.05   
DUR 3-12  0.0033  2.37   
DUR 12+  0.0121  2.43   
AGE * DUR 
Interaction 
n.s.    n.s. 
SIZE     n.s.    n.s. 
W_PART  0.0006  2.26   
W_PART  * 
NORTH 
-0.0005  2.02   
YR-ENTR 
1998-2002 




    OLS 
     coefficient      | t-statistic |  192 cells 
WAGE  1.35  136.23   
CFL-NORTH  -  19.65  7.02   
CFL-SOUTH  -  4.31  1.12   
TAX-REDUCTION  -  17.45  6.10   
MFG  -  3.39  2.67   
GEO(North)  32.62  21.63   
AGE 22-25  3.03  2.09   
AGE 25-30  5.05  2.82     27 
B.4   < MOB >                 |     probit 
  Coefficient  | z  - statistic |  16607  cells 
GEO(North)  0.45  18.40   
MFG  -  0.161  6.77   
AGE 22-25  -  0.078  2.74   
AGE 25-30  -  0.052  1.54   
W-INITIAL  -  0.005  13.01   
YR-ENT  Yes              Yes  (1988 – 2002) 
 
Do these estimates provide a reasonable explanation of the evolution of workforce 
disposal ?   I have argued that labor cost dynamics alone explains almost half of 
average survival in the observation period: about - 12 percentage points,  a fall 
from 100% initial survival to 88 % at the end of the observation window, against 
an observed overall survival of about 75%.   Notice, however, that a large fraction 
of the increase in labor cost is attributable to a reversal of policy decisions – the 
reduction  of  fiscal  benefits  accorded  in  the  Eighties  -  which  accounts  for  an 
increase of 17-20 eu / year, about ¾  of the growth rate of labor costs. Hence a 
substantial amount of workforce disposal may be attributable to the fiscal restraint 
that followed the more generous approach of the Eighties, inspite of the increasing 
flexibility  granted  to  the  vast  majority  of  labor  contracts.      The  additional 
flexibility appears, instead, to have reinforced the process of workforce disposal.  
 
8  Self-selection and truncation behind the door ? 
 
8.1 – Self-selection 
A  problem  of  self-selection  could  be  raised  in  connection  with  our 
measurement  of  “disposable”  workforce.  The  individuals  whom  we  consider 
“disposed”  once  they  leave  the  panel  and  are  no  longer  observable  could,  in 
principle,  be  entering  the  world  of  big  business  (excluding  self  employment, 
which we do observe and account for), or the professions, on a path of upward 
mobility.  There are reasons to believe that the problem is negligible, and that none 
of our results would be harmed.  
The first and stronger argument derives from para. 3 where I explain that 
almost all the young people who move into the public sector are observed in the 
WHIP  database,  the  only  exceptions  being  the  military  service  and  the  police 
corps.  I also explain that the number of those moving in the professions at age 
below 30 is negligible.     The second consideration is that the large majority of the 
quickly “disposed” individuals have had very short initial employment spells and are in 
the lowest percentiles of the wage distribution.  This strongly suggest that early disposal 
has very negative connotations.  Which is  not sufficient to exclude self-selection, but is a 
signal that points in this direction.     28 
The third and final argument – basically a robustness test - integrates the 
last one.  I select the subset of individuals who have “survived” in the first five 
years of career, and observe  their wage 5 years after their first job spell. Many 
have had unemployment spells of various length in the course of their initial 5-
year career.    Wages appear to be strongly negatively influenced by the length of 
the initial employment spell.  Additional controls are necessary to account for the 
impact that job-to-job mobility  may have on wages. Not only do I distinguish 
between stayers and movers, but, for the latter, I also take into account the firm 
size of origin and destination of the last change (there could be more than one). 
This multiplies the number of original cells by a factor of  9 (3 x 3 firm sizes), but, 
as done before, we retain only those that are left with at least 3 individuals (2922). 
Deflated post-5-year wages are regressed against the variables that define the cells, 
including those reflecting mobility.  Results are displayed in Appendix 1.  Self-
selection might arise, in that the individuals included in this sub-sample are the 
“lucky” ones who have not been disposed in the first 5 years of career.  This 
occurrence, however, strengthens our conclusion as the significance of the initial 
job spell on post-entry wages would be hidden by the selection.  It is not:  a good 
start at entry  (employment spells >12 months) is very significant and yields a 
premium  of  48  EU/month  over  the  shorter  spells  (the  3  -12  month-dummy  is 
below significance, the benchmark being provided by the <less than 3 months> 
spell).
28  The premium of a good start (12+ months)  may, at first sight, appear 
small compared to the one associated with a bad start (< 3 months).  This is not the 
case as it amounts to 5% of an average monthly wage of 1000 eu.  Here we are 
imposing a strong restriction: even the bad starts must last at least 5 years, which 
is done by selecting out a very large number of “bad starts” (i.e. those that get 
“disposed”  before  ever  reaching  that  moment).  Altogether,  I  feel  therefore 
confident that self-selection is an unlikely event. 
 
8.2 - Truncation 
Truncation  at  the  end  of  the  observation  period  could  upward  bias  the 
estimate of workforce disposal for those entering in the late Nineties.  This too 
does not seem to be a major problem: the order of magnitude and characteristics of 
survival in the first 5-7 years of career of those who entered the labor market in the 
mid Eighties is similar to what is observed for the younger entries that follow in 
1992 an 1995. In my judgement, the 8-10 year-absence of a young male from 
                                                 
 
28 Some of the other results are not surprising: age matters; so does the geographical area (North 
outperforms South) and the activity branch (manufacturing looses to the services). The mobility 
pattern  yields  an  interesting  and  highly  statistically  significant  ranking:      <big-big>      is  the 
benchmark and tops the list, followed by:  <med-big>  - 107,  <stayers> - 111,  <small-big> -137, 
<big-med> - 189,  <med-med> - 239,   <small-med> - 251,  <big-small>  - 258,  <med-small> - 
290, <small-small>  - 319. 
   29 
administrative files that cover the entire population of economically active people 
is more than sufficient to consider him hit  by “disposal”.  
Evidence is provided by tab. 9. Survival after a certain number of years 
since one’s first job (restricting to initial spells longer than 12 months) is reported 
for labor market entry in 1988, 1992 and 1995.  Truncation bias – if it is relevant - 
must lead to lower survival for all the 1995- entries  compared to  those of  1988 
and 1992.  The data do not reveal such pattern,  the only exception being the 
service industry of the South for the very young cohorts.  This result is unclear, 
but calls, I believe, for explanations that are unrelated to the truncation issue.          
 
Tab. C -  Pseudo survival  2, 4, 5, 7  years since labor market entry 
C.1 - north - manufacturing 
Age 19-22           
Year  of 
entry 
T+2  t+4  t+6  t+7   
1988  .98  .93  .90  .88   
1992  .99  .97  .95  .86   
1995  .98  .95  .92  .90   
           
age 25-30           
1988  .96  .88  .83  .82   
1992  .98  .89  .78  .75   
1995  .99  .92  .84  .84   
 
C.2 - north - services 
age 19-22  T+2  t+4  t+6  t+7   
1988  1  .99  .96  .96   
1992  .94  .90  .90  .90   
1995  .98  .95  .95  .90   
           
age 25-30           
1988  .98  .87  .83  .79   
1992  .93  .85  .80  .75   
1995  .98  .95  .90  .88   
 
C.3 - south – services  
age 19-22  t+2  t+4  t+6  t+7   
1988  1  1  .90  .90   
1992  1  1  .96  .96   
1995  .94  .83  .72  .72   
           
age 25-30           
1988  1  .97  .94  .94   
1992  .92  .85  .81  .81   
1995  1  .89  .82  .79     30 
9  Conclusion 
 
The overall picture is now sufficiently clear: workforce disposal is evident 
and quite dramatic. Unemployment duration is much longer than official sources 
indicate.  The order of magnitude of workforce disposal is consistent with the LFS 
youth unemployment rate increased by an estimate of the number of workers who 
end up in irregular, undetectable activities which is in line with the official ISTAT 
estimates of the irregular economy.   
  Regression analysis catches the medium run impact of several factors: age, 
initial entry conditions, mobility, business cycle,  labor cost.   Labor cost dynamics 
alone explains almost half of average survival in the observation period.  As it 
turns out,  however,  a large fraction of the increase in labor cost is attributable to 
a reversal of policy decisions – the reduction of fiscal benefits accorded in the 
Eighties - which accounts for an increase of 17-20 eu / year, about ¾  of the 
growth rate of labor costs.  Hence a substantial amount of workforce disposal may 
be attributable to the fiscal restraint that followed the more generous approach of 
the Eighties, inspite of the increasing flexibility granted to the vast majority of 
labor contracts.  Indeed the additional flexibility appears to have reinforced the 
process of workforce disposal.   
A complete structural explanation of the - by now 25-years long - process 
of workforce disposal is out of reach, for lack of data that cover the Seventies, i.e. 
years preceding its early stages. Its long run development was undoubtedly fueled 
by  a  sequence  of  labor  market  reforms  initiated  in  the  mid  Eighties,  aimed  at 
enhancing youth employability with the introduction of highly flexible and often 
subsidized working contracts.   To a large extent, however,  the reforms sanctioned 
a process which was already under way.  
 
Additional hints on the long run perspective is provided by cross-country 
comparisons of a few significant macro indicators (tab. D).  Italy and Spain are the 
two European countries where labor market reforms aimed at introducing labor 
market  flexibility  have  been  more  profound:  both  have  made  extensive  use  of 
temporary contracts. As it turns out, Italy and Spain are the only two European 
countries where employment growth 2000-08  exceeds GNP growth (at constant 
prices).  Not only does labor productivity turn downwards (a direct consequence 
of  the  latter),  but  so  does  multi-factor  productivity  since  1995.    Stagnation  of  
aggregate demand and lagging investments must have had an important role in 
these long run developments.  Moreover, our findings suggest that the utilization 
of atypical and temporary contracts for the vast majority of new hires
29, and the 
                                                 
29  As is well known Spain introduced a major reform in 1996 that allowed almost all new hires to 
be  on  a  temporary  basis.  A  few  years  later,  more  restrictive  rules  were  introduced  in  the 
legislation;  nevertheless,  the  share  of  temporary  workers  in  Spain  is  still  much  higher  than 
anywhere else in Europe.   31 
ensuing process of workforce disposal (and waste of human capital)  may have 
been an additional driving force behind this involution.    
Evidence  of  Italy’s  weak  position  vis-à-vis  the  rest  of  its  direct  EU 
competitors is also signaled by the pattern of real wages: stagnant since the early 
Nineties, while in the rest of Europe they were increasing by 10% in the market  
sectors and by 20% and over in manufacturing (fig. 12). 
 
 
Tab. D   -     OECD: 2000-2008  growth rates and multi-factor productivity 
  Employ= 
Ment 











Au  8,2  <  23,4  15,1       
Be  6,7  <  16,0  9,3       
Dk  3,9  <  10,4  6,5  1,5    0,6 
Fl  8,4  <  25,0  16,6  1,3  0,3  1,6 
Fr  5,8  <  14,1  8,3  1,7  2,1  1,0 
Ge  6,0  <  9,7  3,7  1,4  1,1  0,6 
Gr  11,8  <  35,8  24,0    1,0   
Ire  26,1  <  43,4  17,3  3,3  3,5  2,5 
It  10,3  >>  7,3  -3  1,3  0,1  -0,7 
Nl  7,7  <  16,5  8,8  1,0  0,8  0,7 
Por  3,1  <  7,9  4,8    1,2  0,3 
Sp  29,9  >>  28,0  -1.9    0,1   -0,1 
Swe  10,4  <  19,8  9.4  0,5  1,8  2,7 
Uk  8,5  <  20,4  11,9  1,0  1,2  1,2   32 
 
Fig. 12  - Real wages:  Italy vs. EU   33 
 
 
APPENDIX  1 
 
Weighted OLS regression on real wages  5 years after first job entry 
 
  Coeff.  
Age 22-25  43   ** 
Age 25-30  114  *** 
North  165  *** 
Manufacturing  - 109  *** 
First spell  
3-12 months 
15 
First spell  
12+  months 
48  ** 
 Year-of-entry 
dummies 
Yes    *** 
Stayer  - 111  ***   
Big-med  - 189  *** 
Big-small  - 258  *** 
Med-big  - 107  ** 
Med-med  - 240  *** 
Med-small   - 290  *** 
Small-big   - 137  *** 
Small-med   -  251  *** 
Small-small    - 319  *** 
No. obs. cells    2922 





A  nutshell  model  of  labor  demand  involving  permanent  vs.  temporary 
contracts 
 
  The firm faces a vacancy  (V) which may be filled by two alternative contracts: 
(1)  a  permanent  working  contract  with  an  experienced  worker;    (2)  a  subsidized 
temporary  contract  (training-and-work  contract  restricted  to  young  workers,  CFL).  
Which will the firm choose ? 
 
The permanent contract (R ) pays a wage  w  and carries a firing cost equal to FC. 
The temporary contract (F) is a  one-year contract, that can be interrupted at no cost at the 
end of year 1.  It pays a lower wage  t w -  (where [1 – t] is the subsidized fraction of total 
wage) -   and requires a training at a cost of  f  per year.  At the beginning of year 2 it 
must  be renewed as a R - contract.    34 
 
Nature has two states:  a “profitable” state, with probability  g;  and a  “recessionary” 
state with probability (1-g). If “good” occurs,  the firm’s revenue is  P, otherwise it is  0.   
At the end of period 1 the firm assesses the performance of  each worker, after observing 
her/his performance:  “good”  with probability  p  and “bad”  with probability (1 –p).   
 
Only if  nature is “profitable” will the firm continue operations  in period 2.  If  year 1 is 
“recessionary”,  the firm will fire her worker (at cost FC  if the contract is permanent), no 
matter how good he/she is. 
 
If the worker turns out to be “good” he is retained; otherwise he is fired.  
 





State  of 
nature 
period 1 





Renew  or 
fire 
State  of 
nature 
period 2 
Payoff  in 
period 2 
  G  P – w   P  Renew  R  g  P – w 
  G  P – w   P  Renew R  1 - g  - w - FC 
R 
G  P – w  1 –p  Fire  & 
open  new 
vacancy  
new start  V – FC 
  1 – g  - w   P  Fire  & 
closeout  
exit  - FC 
 
  1 – g  - w  1 – p  Fire  & 
closeout 
exit  - FC 
 
 
  G  P – f – t w    P  Renew  & 
transform 
in   R 
 g  P – w 
F 
G  P – f – t w    P  Renew  & 
transform 
in   R 
1 – g  - w – FC 
  G  P – f – t w   1 – p  Fire  & 
open  new 
vacancy 
new start  V 
  1 – g  - f – t w   P  Fire  & 
closeout 
exit  0 
  1 – g  - f – t w  1 – p  Fire  & 
closeout 
exit  0 
 
Letting E(R)  and  E(F)  be the expected values of filling a vacancy by way of R or F,  the 
following condition is obtained after working out the details of the model 
 
E (R )  >  E (F)  iff     w (1 – t ) +  (1 – g p ) FC   <  f   35 
 
which has a straightforward interpretation:  the permanent contract  R  is preferred to the 
temporary  youth  contract    F    if  the  fiscal  opportunity  cost  of    not  using  a  CFL 
(temporary) contract plus the expected firing cost is less than the training cost associated 
with the subsidized contract.  
 
The following empirical results are to be expected: 
-  the subsidized temporary contracts  will  be  preferred when the wage 
subsidy (t)  is sufficiently high;  
-  the temporary contract is preferred  in positions that require low skills,  
i.e. where  the training cost of the unskilled or their foregone  productivity (f)  is 
low; 
-  the advantage of  hiring via permanent contracts is higher, the higher the 
“quality” of  the  candidate recruits  (when  p  is large); 
-   the temporary contract is preferred in times of recession (when  g  is 
small);  
-    large firms  will  have  a  relative  preference  for  temporary  workers,  as 




APPENDIX  3 
 
SELECTED  STATISTICS ON LONG TERM UNEMPLOYMENT 
   
UNEMPLOYMENT 






              (*) 
 
%  STILL 
UNEMPLOYED 















      (*) 
 
FRACTION  OF 
LONG  TERM 
UNEMPLOYED 
(12 MONTHS +) 
 
     2000 
 
     (**) 
 
FRACTION  OF 
LONG  TERM 
UNEMPLOYED 
(12 MONTHS +) 
 
      2007 
 
       (**) 
AU        10.0  13.9 
BE        29.4  37.2 
DK   6.06  0.199   9.11  13.6   6.7 
FL         8.8   5.9 
FR   8.91  0.362  11.01  20.0  28.9 
GE   7.60  0.282  10.51  23.7  35.3 
GR   8.69  0.227   8.29  42.5  32.3 
IRE   7.16  0.200   8.73  22.2  25.3 
IT  12.01  0.352  11.60  58.0  46.0 
SP   7.82  0.223   8.50  30.9  12.9 
NL         9.1  13.5 
NO         1.3   3.1 
                                                 
30  Three of the four above expected results were found to hold in B. Contini  (2005). No evidence was 
available on the one related to workers’ “quality”, for lack of appropriate indicators of quality.    36 
POR        18.8  28.4 
SWE        11.0   3.4 
UK  10.09  0.265  10.51  17.4.  20.0 
 (*)      ECHP  1994-2001  -  MALE  AGE  20-60    (from    K..  TATSIRAMOS, 
“Unemployment  insurance  in  Europe:  unemployment  duration  and  subsequent 
employment stability”,   IZA  WP 2280 (2006), forthcoming JEEA. 
(**)  OECD STATISTICS -  MALE AGE 15-24 
 
 
APPENDIX  4    -   LABOR SUPPLY 
 
Fig.  6  depicts  how  the  labor  market  operates  when,  in  addition  to  the 
regular (official) economy that includes permanent and temporary jobs (there is no 
need here to keep the two types separate), there is an irregular economy, black or 
grey, which is undetected in labor force surveys.  D-reg  is the demand schedule of 
regular jobs (permanent and/or temporary), w*  being a minimum wage-equivalent 
negotiated at the institutional level (in Italy there is no mandated minimum wage);  
D-irr  is a very elastic demand schedule of the irregular economy. LS is labor 
supply  (total labor supply = OD).   OB are the regularly employed persons.  Those 
who do not get hired in the regular sector at a wage no less than w*, can find a job 
in  the  irregular  economy  at  lower  pay,    up  to  the  intersection  of  demand  and 
supply    (BC  is  the  irregular  employment);    the  remaining    CD  represent  the 
unemployed.         
 
 
    Fig. 6 -  Labor demand and supply with regular and irregular economies 
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